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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES; 
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIA-
TION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY 
PUMPERS , INC . , 
SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 16891 
Appellants, 
-vs-
P.S.C.U. 
Case No. 76-023-04 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chair-
man; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Conunis-
sioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE, 
Commissioner, 
Respondents. 
The Appellants respectfully submit this Reply to·tne 
Brief of C.P. National. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT IN CONTESTING THE ACTIONS OF THE 
COMMISSION AND IN REQUESTING THAT A REFUND 
BE GRANTED. 
Respondent's brief contends and initially argues that 
Appellants have improperly stated a claim for relief and because 
this court is not allowed to order a refund, Appellants action 
should be barred. 
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Respondent's argument is a misconception, and misses the 
mark by misconstruing the language contained in appellants brief. 
Appellants are properly before this court inasmuch as they are 
requesting and arguing, (1) that rates placed into effect by the 
February 18 Order were not just and reasonable, (2) that the 
findings of the Commission were unsupported by the evidence, (3) 
that the Commission improperly exercised its authority according 
to law, and (4) that the constitutional rights of appellants 
have been invaded. 
Section 54-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, declares that "Every unjust or 
unreasonable charge made, demanded or received for such product 
or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. 1 
Implicit in appellants original brief in the statement of facts 
and in Points I, II, III, and VI is the showing that the rates 
allowed were unlawful and by clear analysis unjust and unreasonable 
Points III and VI of Appellants original brief argue that 
the findings of fact made by the Commission are not supported by 
any evidence. 
Point III of Appellants original brief argues that the 
Commission improperly exercised its authority when it imposed 
retroactive rates on customers and likewise Point VI asserted that 
the conclusions of law by the Commission were arbitrary. 
The issue of a violation of Constitutional rights is clearly 
raised in Point V of Appellant's brief. 
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One issue that presently deserves greater attention than 
was afforded in Appellants initial brief is the question of who 
has the power under Utah Statutes to grant a rate refund in this 
matter. The recent decision in Utah Department of Business Regula-
tion v. Public Service Commission, Case No. 16241, filed June 19, 
1980, prompts this discussion. 
Under the above case, this court refused to grant a refund 
inasmuch as it would involve an entanglement with the legislative 
power of ratemaking. Under the facts of that proceeding the 
Department of Business Regulation entertained the request for a 
refund for the first time on appeal and it had never requested the 
Commission to grant a refund either at a hearing or by way of 
petition for rehearing. 
Under the present factual setting, appellants initial request 
for a refund was addressed to the Commission. That request has 
been repeated in a long string of hearings, re-hearings and appeals. 
Our understanding of the language of the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation case, supra, (as yet unreported), insofar as 
"refunds" are concerned, is that the amount thereof is to be 
determined by the Public Service Commission, not this court. With 
this we agree. Hearings to determine the facts should only be 
held before the commission. However, this court can properly 
determine as a matter of law whether or not a refund is required 
and can then direct the commission to establish the amount of the 
same and how and to whom it is to be paid. 
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In many jurisdictions the question of court or Corrunission 
ordered refunds is explicitely mandated by statute. In other 
jurisdictions though, the matter has been of some dispute. The 
supreme Court of the State of Minnesota when confronted with 
questions of whether the court could under certain circumstances 
order a refund stated that there was no statutory impediment to 
requiring a utility to refund to consumers charges it had made 
pursuant to an order of the Corrunission which was subsequently 
reversed. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State Minn. Sup. Ct. 
No.130 1/2, 1974, 216 N.W. 2d, 841. The court in providing its 
reasoning stated at p. 858: 
We recognize that there is authority for the 
proposition that ratemaking is a legislative 
process with some of the attributes of a statute 
and that rates which have been approved by a 
commission are valid until set aside. In juris-
dictions adopting this rule, the reversal of a 
corrunission order increasing rates has only pros-
pective effect. However, we think the better 
view was expressed in Mountain States T.&T. Co. 
v. Pulbic Utilities Corron., Colo., 502 P.2d 945, 
949 (1972), where the court allowed benefits, 
accruing as a result of a revision in its public 
utilities corrunission's order, to be passed on to 
telephone subscribers. 
[17] In scrutinizing the Minnesota statutes 
which govern telephone rates, we find no impedi-
ment to authorizing a refund. Minn.St. 237.06 
declares that "[a]ll unreasonable rates, tolls, 
and charges are hereby declared to be unlawful." 
Section 237.08 prohibits a telephone company 
from collecting or receiving a greater or lesser 
rate than that on file with the Public Service 
Commission. We do not construe that statute to 
prevent a refund if the commission's order is 
ultimately found to be invalid. Section 237.25 
deals with the trial court's scope of review. 
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It provides in part: "[I]f the court finds that 
the order appealed from is unjust, unreasonable, 
and not supported by the evidence, it shall make 
such order to take the place of the order appealed 
from as is justified by the record before it." 
Finally, § 237.26 provides: 
If no appeal is taken from any order of the 
department, as above provided, then in all liti-
gation thereafter arising between the state and 
any telephone company or between private parties 
and any telephone company, the order shall be 
deemed final and conclusive. 
[18] Nothing in our statutes, unlike those 
in Illinois, for example, expressly deals with 
the question of whether new rates shall be enforced 
or suspended pending appeal. Nor do the statutes 
provide for segregating in a special fund amounts 
received under a new rate schedule pending a final 
decision on appeal. We conclude that the Minne-
sota statutes contemplate that only rates ultim-
ately .found to be reasonable shall be charged 
against subscribers and:.~:that amounts collected by 
a utility pending appeal enjoy no unique immunity 
from the claims of those to whom they rightfully 
belong. 
[19] We leave to the Public Service Commis-
sion the mechanics of determining the amount of 
refund which is due and the precise manner of its 
distribution. 
Utah statutory language as it applies to utilities is anala-
gous to that of Minnesota's. Section 54-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, (as 
previously cited) states as does the Minnesota statute that unjust 
and unreasonable charges are prohibited and declared unlawful. 
Section 54-7-12, U.C.A. 1953, generally prohibits a utility from 
changing or increasing rates unless on file with the Commission, 
and Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 76, (Commission Rule of 
Practice Under Rule 21, Section 21.6) like Minnesota's allows this 
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court to "reverse, affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed 
from." 
Irregardless of whether it is a court or corrunission ordered 
refund, appellants contend that the Commission has no alternative 
but to order a refund of revenues collected by C.P. National 
pursuant to an order which was subsequently reversed by this court. 
Section 54-7-17(4) U.C.A. 1953, providing for a stay of com-
mission orders and other procedures on appeal, contemplates such 
requested refunds and it has been shown in Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. v. Public Utilities Corrunission, 502 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1972), 
that the stay provisions of this section are separable from the 
refund provisions and are not mandatory. 
It is for these reasons that relief should be granted and a 
refund ordered in this proceeding. 
POINT II. 
THE CONCEPT OF "OFFSET AND PASS-THRU" 
CASES HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE SETTING. 
It is appellants initial and repeated position that at the 
time this court reversed and remanded the case of Parowan Pumpers 
Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 586 P.2d 407, (Utah, 1978), 
the prior rates imposed by the corrunission became invalid and that 
any attempt to reinstate by amendment such rates would constitute 
retroactive rate making. 
While some courts have held that rates approved by a commis-
sion are valid until set aside, current authority has more consis-
tently held that an invalid order is void from its inception, and 
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rates collected pursuant thereto are therefore subject to refund. 
In Gulf, C.& S.F.R.Y. Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 130 
S.W. 2d 1030 (1939), the Texas Supreme Court stated: 
Manifestly, to hold that either the shipper 
or carrier could be required to pay or collect 
~n i~lega~ rate p~nding ~he statutory proceed-
ing in which the illegality of the rate is 
determined, would be unfair to both the shipper 
and the carrier; and the constitutionality of 
such a rule is seriously doubted. 
* * * 
When the court exercises this statutory 
jurisdiction and declares the rate order 
invalid from its inception, and the rate 
order must be regarded as if it never 
existed. (emphasis added) 
Further in support of this proposition, appellants cited in 
their initial brief the decision of City of Los Angeles, et al. v. 
Public Utility Commission, et al., 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 
785 (1972), which held that: 
When the rates set in the decision before us 
are annulled, the only lawful rates are those which 
were in existence prior to the instant decision. 
We are satisfied that to permit the commission to 
fix new rates for the purpose of refunds, as re-
quested by Pacific, would involve retroactive 
rate making in violation of the principles recogn-
ized in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm. 
supra, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
401 P.2d 353. 
Respondent's argue in their brief that the above California 
holding is limited by the California rule which "in effect" allows 
retroactive ratemaking in "Offset and Pass Thru" cases. By 
analysis they argue that the present fact setting involves an 
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"offset or pass-thru" type proceeding and as such should not be 
subject to the non retroactive rate making rule. 
In support of their position that the California courts 
allow this type of procedure, they cite the 1978 decision in 
Southern California Edison Company v. Public Utility Commission, 
144 Cal. Rptr. 905, 576 P.2d 945 and the 1979 decision California 
Manufacturers Association v. Public Utility Commission, Southern 
California Gas Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, 
155 Cal. Rptr. 664, 595 P.2d 98, and conclude the following: 
Thus, the most recent decisions of the 
California Supreme Court have limited the 
rule prohibiting retroactive rate making to 
a general rate case and have determined that 
the rule has no application to the abbreviated 
"off se.t" or "pas s-thru" proceedings. 
The above assertion of Respondent is highly misleading. 
Both of the above California cases dealt exclusively with ab-
breviated proceedings concerning "narrowly restricted" and 
"semi-automatic" fuel cost adjustment clauses. Here, the Califor~ 
court language dealing with retroactive rate making is taken out 
of context by respondent when it is construed to have application 
to other than a fuel cost adjustment proceeding. Respondents are 
clearly aware that the California courts confined such "non-
retroactive" language only to fuel adjustment proceedings and to 
none other. 
Hence, respondents are involved in purely speculative reason-
ing wh~n they state that the case now before this court is an 
"offset or pass-thru" proceeding. 
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This present case is not a fuel adjustment clause proceeding, 
but is one that more clearly resembles a general rate proceeding. 
Because of this, rates should be allowed to take effect only on 
a prospective basis and respondents argument that the California 
rule should apply should be totally disregarded. 
11", 
DATED this q7gJ~ay of August, 1980. 
a~Aw~M_/ 
,..,---JAMES L . BA 
( ~Assistant Attorney General 
\._/ 
OTT LE 
Clyde & Pratt 
Attorney for Protestants, 
Plaintiffs herein 
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